Recently several semi-device independent quantum protocols were proposed -e.g. for secure key distribution, random access coding, and randomness generation -in a scenario where no assumption on the internal working of the devices used in the protocol is made, except their dimension. These protocols, while being often more practical than fully-device independent ones, are also clearly more secure than their device dependent counterparts. Nevertheless, we discuss conditions under which detection inefficiencies can be exploited to fake the result of the protocol -and how to prevent itin terms of the detection probability and of the worst case success probability of a random access code.
I. INTRODUCTION
In the last decades, the distinguishing properties of quantum theory have been exploited to accomplish tasks which are unfeasible in classical theory [1] . For example, protocols were proposed for secure quantum key distribution (QKD) [2, 3] , quantum teleportation [4, 5] , and quantum randomness generation (QRG) [6] [7] [8] . With no exceptions, the first protocols to be proposed were device dependent, namely their success critically relies on the agreement between the description of the setup and its implementation. Since this hypothesis is never exactly fulfilled, in experimental implementations a plethora of related problems arises [9] .
Subsequently, fully-device independent protocols were proposed [8, 10, 11] , in a scenario where the devices are completely uncharacterized and the success only depends on the statistics between inputs and outputs. These protocols, while extremely robust due to the weakness of the hypothesis on which they rely, are often unfeasible from the experimental viewpoint. For example, known device independent QKD protocols are entanglementbased, while all experimental realizations of QKD implement prepare and measure schemes.
Recently, semi-device independent quantum protocols were proposed, where only the dimension of the exchanged system is assumed while the devices are uncharacterized. These protocols represent an intermediate solution between device-dependent and fully deviceindependent protocols. For example, at the price of upper bounding the dimension of the system, secure QKD is possible [12] in a measure and prepare scheme, and semi-device independent protocols for QRG are also known [13] .
Despite their security, real world implementations of semi-device independent protocols are subject to detection loophole (DL) attacks [14] -as happens for any fullydevice independent protocol. In this attack, a malicious provider exploits non-ideal detection efficiencies to skew the statistics of the experiment and ultimately faking its result. Losses may affect not only the measuring devices, but also the preparing ones. For example, if the preparations are produced with heralded photons, an entangled pair is prepared and one of its photons measured by a lossy device to collapse the other to the desired state.
The aim of this work is to provide conditions under which DL attack is harmless in faking the result of a semidevice independent protocol. In Section II we introduce DL attacks and present our main results. In Section II A we derive conditions under which a DL attack is harmless in terms of the detection probability, in the general framework where only the statistics of the protocol is taken into account. In Section II B we regard semi-device independent protocols as random access codes, and show that protocols that only depend on a particular function of the statistics -namely, the worst case success probability -are immune to DL attack. Finally we summarize our results and delineate some further developments in Section III.
II. DETECTION LOOPHOLE ATTACK
In the setup of any semi-device independent protocol two distant parties, say Alice and Bob, are involved. In this work we consider protocols in which each party has access to uncorrelated random number generators [19] . For each round, we denote by j (i) the random variable generated by Alice's (Bob's) generator and with q j (p i ) its probability distribution. These probability distributions are independent. Random variables j and i represent the strategy that Alice and Bob apply, respectively. This scheme is depicted in Figure 1 .
In each run, they get classical inputs a and b respectively. Alice sends a message A -which may be classical or quantum -to Bob, who then returns a classical value B. Finally they collect the statistics of several runs (the asymptotic case is always considered), obtaining the conditional probability distribution P (B|a, b) of outcome B Alice's and Bob's boxes receive classical input a and b respectively. Each box is allowed to use a classical random generator (dashed-line boxes), which outcome -j for Alice's box and i for Bob's -is not accessible to the parties but can influence the outcome of the box. Alice's box sends quantum message A to Bob, that finally outputs classical message B.
given inputs a and b, namely
It is important to stress that -as Eq. (1) clearly showsaccess is granted only to the inputs a, b and the output B, while no knowledge of the internal behavior of the black boxes (including the random variables i, j) and of the message A is provided.
In the context of DL attack we assume that for each round of the experiment Alice or Bob can claim that their "detector did not click", and in this case this round of the experiment is discarded from the statistics. In general, Alice's box can decide whether to click after receiving her input a and random variable j, while Bob's box after receiving his input b, the message A and random variable i. Thus, the detection efficiencies, i.e. the probabilities that the detector clicks, are denoted with η j (a) for Alice and η i (A, b) for Bob, and the conditional probability distribution of outcome B given inputs a and b in the presence of a DL attack is given by
We use the subfix DL whenever a distribution is obtained resorting to DL attack. We are assuming that for every input a, b there is a non-zero probability of click, namely denominator in Eq. (2) is strictly larger than 0 for any a and b.
Notice that whether Alice uses DL is not relevant [20] , since any settings she can prepare with DL can also clearly be achieved without resorting to it, so Eq. (2) can be simplified as
. (3) A. Security based on the detection probability
The success of semi-device independent quantum protocols depends on the statistics they generate. Usually, a large enough value of a particular function of such statistics ensures the success of the protocol. Yet, in general, a necessary condition for their success is the ability to discriminate whether the source is intrinsically quantum or it can be described as a classical distribution, building only on the knowledge of the conditional probability distribution P (B|a, b). That is, it is necessary to certify that the observed correlations cannot be explained classically and, therefore, are potentially useful for quantum protocols without classical analogue. For this reason, exploiting DL attack to convert a classical P (B|a, b) into an intrinsically quantum P DL (B|a, b) guarantees a faking of the result of the protocol. In this Section we provide conditions under which DL attack can by no means recast a classical P (B|a, b) into an intrinsically quantum P DL (B|a, b) thus faking the result of the protocol.
We say that a conditional probability distribution P (B|a, b) of outcome B given inputs a on Alice's side and b on Bob's side admits a classical (quantum) ddimensional model if it can be written as
and where A is a classical (quantum) d-dimensional system.
The probability of click on Bob's side given he received message A from Alice and input b is given by
where we denoted with N C the no-click event. The following Proposition shows that whenever Q(B =N C|A, b) is independent on A, DL attack is harmless. Notice that this is the case for example whenever loss can reasonably be modeled as affecting the measurement irrespectively of the input state, namely the detection efficiencies η i (A, b) are independent on A. 
Upon setting
one clearly has B P DL (B|A, b) = 1 and
Then, whenever
Since by assumption the devices are uncharacterized and the message A sent by Alice to Bob is not directly accessible to the parties, it is impossible without introducing other assumptions to verify whether the detection efficiencies η i (A, b) are indeed independent on A. Next Proposition provides conditions under which the hypothesis of Proposition 1 is verified in terms of the probability Q(B =N C|a, b) of click given inputs a on Alice's side and b on Bob's side, namely
Notice that this probability is accessible to the parties, being a function of the inputs a, b which are in turn accessible. Rearranging explicitly the terms in previous Equation and using the fact P (A = 1|a) = 1 − P (A = 0|a) for any a, one obtains that either P (A=0|a=a 0 ) = P (A=0|a=a 1 ), for any or a 0 , a 1 , namely the message A sent by Alice is independent on her input a, or
for any b, namely the probability of click on Bob's side is independent on the message A received from Alice.
In the former case P (B|a, b) clearly admits a classical local model, namely one in which no message is sent from Alice to Bob, and the same holds true for P DL (B|a, b) due to Eq. (3). In the latter case the hypothesis of Proposition 1 is satisfied, and thus the statement is proven.
B. Security based on the success probability
In previous Section we discussed conditions under which it is impossible to fake a necessary condition for the success of any semi-device independent protocol, in the general framework where the statistics of the protocol is taken into account. In the present Section, we devise functions of such statistics that can not be altered by a DL attack in the particular framework of (quantum) random access codes. Thus, any semi-device independent protocol building only on these functions will be immune to DL attack.
A semi-device independent protocol can be viewed as a random access code (RAC) or a quantum random access code (QRAC) [21] . In the context of RACs and QRACs, the aim of the two distant parties Alice and Bob is to maximize the value of some figure of merit which is a function of the input/output statistics. RACs (QRACs) are usually denoted with the notation n → m. Here n is the number of input bits of Alice, namely the dimension of input a is dim(a) = 2 n , while m is the number of bits (qubits) sent by Alice, namely the dimension of message A is dim(A) = 2 m . In this Section we exploit the formalism of RACs and QRACs and consider as a figure of merit the worst case success probability to have that B = f (a, b) for a specific function f (a, b) ∈ {0, 1}, namely
The probability that B = f (a, b) with the DL exploit is given by
where w i (A, a, b) = p i η i (A, b)P (A|a) and the worst case probability that B = f (a, b) is given by
The following Proposition provides conditions under which the worst case success probability can not be increased resorting to DL exploit. When these hypothesis are satisfied, a protocol relying on the worst case success probability may not be affected by DL attack. Proposition 3. If the worst case success probability without resorting to DL attack is P wc =1/2, then the worst case probability of success resorting to DL attack is P wc DL =1/2. Proof. The proof proceeds by absurd assuming P wc = 1/2 and P wc DL > 1/2. Equation (4) is the weighted sum of the numbers P i (B = f (a, b) |A, b) with weights w i (A, a, b) = p i η i (A, b)P (A|a) and therefore is upper bounded by
and one has
Since we are assuming P given inputs a and b is given bỹ
This new strategy does not resort to DL and since P i0 (B = f (a, b)|A 0 , b) > 1/2 it has the worst case success probability greater thañ
which contradicts the assumptions.
The following Corollary shows that for any n → 1 RAC the DL attack is harmless. Corollary 1. For any n → 1 RAC the worst case success probability resorting to DL attack is P wc DL =1/2. Proof. In [22] it was shown that for any n → 1 RAC the hypothesis of Proposition 3 are fulfilled, namely P wc = 1/2, so the statement follows.
In the case of 2 → 1 and 3 → 1 QRACs the worst case success probabilities are Q 2 = correspondingly [21] . If the detectors are inefficient and Bob's device randomly chooses the outcome when its detector did not click then these probabilities become ηQ 2 + (1 − η) 1 2 and ηQ 3 + (1 − η) 1 2 which for all efficiencies η > 0 are better than the classical success probability. Notice however that this is as far as QRACs can go because for all n > 3 one has that n → 1 QRACs have worst case success probability equal to 1 2 [23] . One may ask whether it is possible to relax the hypothesis of Proposition 3. We provide here an example of RAC with worst case success probability larger than 1/2, and show that this probability can be increased using DL attack. Consider the 3 → log 6 RAC. Alice is given three independent bits a 0 , a 1 , a 2 , namely a = a 0 ⊗ a 1 ⊗ a 1 , and she can send to Bob a 6-dimensional message or, equivalently, one bit A 0 and one trit A 1 , namely A = A 0 ⊗ A 1 . Bob's input is the trit b = 0, 1, 2 and the function to be computed is f (a, b) = a b .
Here we show that the worst case success probability P wc without resorting to DL of 3 → log 6 RAC is P wc < 0.981, while there exists a DL attack such that the worst case success probability is P wc DL = 1. First, we prove that for the 3 → log 6 RAC one has P wc < 0.981. Information Causality [24] provides a bound on average case quantum success probability of n → m QRAC. Also, an explicit upper bound for the worst case quantum success probability -which is clearly at least as large as the classical one P wc -was derived in [25] in the context of quantum finite automata, namely
where h(.) is the Shannon binary entropy function. Setting n = 3 and m = log 6 we get P wc < 0.981. Now we provide a protocol using DL which achieves the worst case success probability P wc DL = 1. The idea is to use part of the communicated message to distribute randomness. Alice can choose the trit A 1 at random and encode A 0 = a A1 , in other words she sends one of her bits randomly to Bob but also sends him information regarding which bit it is. If b = A 1 then Bob returns B = A 0 which is equal to a b . If b = A 1 his detector does not click. The detection efficiency of Bob's device with this protocol is given by η i (A, b) = δ b,A1 (according to Proposition 1, DL attack would be harmless if η i (A, b) is independent on A) and the worst case success probability is given by P wc DL = 1.
III. CONCLUSION
In this work we addressed the problem of how non-ideal detection efficiencies can be exploited to fake the result of semi-device independent quantum protocols through DL attacks. We discussed conditions under which DL attacks are harmless in terms of the detection probability and of the worst case success probability of a RAC. Our main results can be used as a guideline to devise quantum protocols resistant to DL attacks, being thus of relevance for applications such as QKD and QRG.
Some of the presented results -namely Proposition 2 and Corollary 1 -hold in the hypothesis that the message A sent by Alice is 2-dimensional and classical. We showed through the example 3 → log 6 RAC that these assumptions can not be relaxed trivially. Thus remains an open problem how to devise more general conditions under which DL attack is harmless.
